Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud by Scott, Austin W., Jr.




Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant
Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud
Austin W. Scott Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott, Austin W. Jr., "Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud" (1953).




Journal of the State Bar Association
Volume 37 January, 1953 No. 2
CRIMNAL JURISDICTION OF A STATE OVER A
DEFENDANT BASED UPON PRESENCE SECURED
BY FORCE OR FRAUD
AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*
ONE old-fashioned type of lawlessness in law enforcement which
seems to be flourishing with some vigor today' is the police prac-
tice of out-of-state kidnapping of a person accused of crime, fol-
lowed by the abduction of the accused against his will into the state
whose criminal laws were violated for trial.' These strenuous
measures may be undertaken by the police officers of the state
whose laws were violated, or by other persons at the instigation of
those officers. Sometimes the kidnapping is accomplished not in
another state of the United States but in a foreign country, whence
the victim is imported into the state for trial.'
This illegal practice is, of course, the outgrowth of the rule of
criminal jurisdiction that only the state whose criminal law is
violated has jurisdiction to try the violator for the crime.4 Thus
the accused person who is in another state or country must some-
how be brought into the state which is to try him. There is a law-
ful, peaceful way of accomplishing this in most cases-by extradi-
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. The basis for this statement is the number of cases in the reports
of appellate courts in which the claim is made that this type of lawlessness
occurred. The cases are collected in the American Digest System, Criminal
Law, key No. 99, and appear throughout this article.
2. This type of lawless law enforcement was not mentioned in the
Wickersham Report, National Commission on Law Observance and En-
forcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931), which con-
centrated its attention on the "third degree" and various kinds of unfairness
of trial courts and prosecutors in the prosecution of criminal cases.
3. In practice, a less common method than kidnapping, but so nearly
alike as to be governed by the same principles, is police enticement of the
accused person into the state by fraud, deception, trickery, rather than by
force. In spite of the absence of reported cases, this method will thus be con-
sidered within the scope of this article.
4. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 427 (1934). There is no similar
limitation in civil procedure, except perhaps as to civil actions which are
not transitory.
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tion of the accused.- Sometimes, however, this may not be a very
effective method. It is often slow and cumbersome. Sometimes the
offense is not extraditable, because the accused did not "flee from
justice" within the meaning of the United States Constitution and
extradition statute.7 Sometimes too the governor of the asylum
state refuses to surrender the accused on the demand of the au-
thorities of the demanding state." Dissatisfaction with extradition
procedure has tempted law enforcement officials to use a short-cut
-that is, to secure the presence of the accused by the illegal use of
5. U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, provides: "A person charged in
any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice,
and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of
the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state
having jurisdiction of the crime." This not being self-executing, Congress in
1793 enacted 1 Stat. 302 (1793), 18 U. S. C. § 3182 (1948), to enforce the
Constitutional provision: "Whenever the executive authority of any State or
Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive
authority of any State, District, or Territory to which such person has
fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before
a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with
having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by
the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the
person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or
Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and
secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent
of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive
to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears
within thirty days from the time of arrest, the prisoner may be discharged."
6. See Waite, Criminal Law and its Enforcement 718-21 (3d ed. 1947)
on practical difficulties involved in extradition procedure.
7. It is perfectly possible to commit a crime in a state without ever be-
ing present in that state, e.g. by shooting the victim by firing across the state
line, State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602 (1894), 115 N. C. 811, 20
S. E. 729 (1894) ; by abandoning a child, leaving the state before the child's
birth, Ex parte Mo, 62 Mont. 137, 204 Pac. 175 (1921) ; by non-support of
the family, where the failure to support begins only after the accused has left
the state, Wigchert v. Lockhart, 114 Colo. 485, 166 P. 2d 988 (1946) ; by
defrauding the victim by use of the mails; or by sending poison food or
drink through the mails; or, as principal, by hiring an agent to commit a
crime. In each of the cases cited supra the offense was held to be not ex-
traditable, because the defendant did not "flee from justice" and there was
no state statute in the asylum state authorizing extradition in the case of a
non-fugitive.
This large loop-hole in the criminal law has been to a great extent
plugged by the adoption by 34 states of the Uniform Crmiinal Extradition
Act, § 6 of which provides for the extradition of non-fugitives as well as
fugitives. This provision has been held constitutional. Although it goes
further than the United States Constitution and extradition statute, note 5
mpra, it does not conflict with them, but rather regulates in an area not
covered by them and so within the states' reserved powers. State v. Kriss,
62 A. 2d 568 (Md. 1948); People v. Herberich, 276 App. Div. 852, 93
N. Y. S. 2d 272 (1949) aff'd mere., 301 N. Y. 614, 93 N. E. 2d 913 (1950);
English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N. E. 2d 898 (1947).
8. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1861), held that in spite of
the Constitution and statute, note 5 supra, there is no power in the federal
government to make the governor of the asylum state surrender the accused.
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force, either with or without the active help or passive acquiescence
of the police officials of the asylum state.
The person who is thus kidnapped and brought for trial into
the state having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the crime
may urge that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant (or, if it has jurisdiction, that it should not exercise this
jurisdiction) in view of the illegal manner in which his presence
in the state was obtained. In the reported cases he usually raises
this issue of jurisdiction over the person either in the trial court
by a plea to the jurisdiction, or by applying after the abduction for
a writ of habeas corpus in a state or federal court."
As to whether the state has, or ought to exercise, jurisdiction
over the person of the kidnapped accused, there are two principal
problems to be considered: (1) Does the United States Constitu-
tion, or do any federal statutes, forbid a state to try such a de-
fendant? (2) If not-so that the issue is simply a matter for state
law to decide-does the state law forbid trial of such a defendant?
There have arisen several related problems not within the scope
of this article except to the extent that their solutions may be use-
ful by way of analogy in deciding the problems raised by the kid-
napping cases. One is the problem of the effect on a state's jurisdic-
tion of an illegal arrest within (not outside) the state.10 Another is
the problem of the effect on a state's jurisdiction of the fact that
the accused was brought into the state for purposes of trial by
federal officials who properly had him in custody for a federal
offense." Still another is the problem of irregularity in the extra-
9. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 12(b) (2), it has
been held that a kidnapped defendant must challenge personal jurisdiction
by a pre-trial motion; it is too late to raise the issue by a motion in arrest
of judgment after verdict. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F. 2d 583 (2d
Cir. 1952). Failure to raise the point early constitutes a waiver. Id.
10. The arrest may b-- without a warrant where a warrant is required;
or, if pursuant to a warrant, there may be some defect in the warrant. It is
generally held that the court nevertheless has jurisdiction to try him. See
Note, 96 A.L.R. 982 (1935). It has been pointed out that this kind of mis-
conduct is not very serious in its consequences to the defendant, since the
law provides that the arrested person be taken before a magistrate to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient cause to hold him for trial, which is the same
question which is to be decided when an application for a warrant is made.
Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L. Q. 337, 349 (1939).
Thus decisions which hold that this type of misconduct does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction are not applicable to cases of kidnapping and abduction,
involving more serious misconduct and more drastic consequences to the
accused.
11. It is generally held that this activity is not misconduct at all, so
that of course the state has jurisdiction to try the accused. Ponzi v. Fessen-
den, 258 U. S. 254 (1922), is the leading case.
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dition proceedings, such as where the asylum state surrenders the
accused to the demanding state although the extradition laws of
the asylum state do not provide for the extradition of such a per-
son.12 Lastly, there is the problem of the jurisdiction of federal
(not state) courts over a defendant kidnapped and imported from
a foreign country. 3
A. FEDERAL CONTROL OVER THE STATES
Is there anything in the United States Constitution or statutes
forbidding a state to try a defendant who was kidnapped from an-
other state or country? The provisions to be considered are: (1)
The extradition clause of the Constitution (and the federal extradi-
tion statute enforcing the Constitutional clause) ;14 (2) the federal
kidnapping statute;'- and (3) the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. 6
The provisions of the United States Constitution and statute
relating to extradition' 7 do not on their face purport to deal with
the effect on jurisdiction of failure properly to extradite; there is
certainly no express provision that failure of a state to extradite
peacefully will cause that state to lose jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has held that there is nothing in these provisions which would
be violated by trial by a state of a defendant whose presence in
12. One type of case of this sort is the extradition of a person, even
though he is a non-fugitive, see note 7 upra, and even though the asylun
state's extradition law does not provide for extradition of non-fugitives.
Compare Uniform Criminal Extradition Act § 6, note 7 supra. Another is
extradition procured by false affidavits or testimony. The cases generally
hold that the state which secures his presence through irregular extradition
has jurisdiction in spite of this irregularity. See Note, 165 A.L.R. 947, 962-
965 (1946).
13. The United States Supreme Court has not decided this problem.
The lower federal courts have held that there is jurisdiction, United States
'v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), aff'd, 5 F. 2d 492 (9th
Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 566 (1925) ; United States v. Insull, 8 F.
Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1934); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Texas
1934). See Chandler v. United States, 171 F. 2d 921, 934 (1st Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U. S. 918 (1949) ; Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2d 962,
972 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1950).
14. See note 5 mupra.
15. 47 Stat. 326 (1932), as amended, 48 Stat. 781 (1934), 18 U. S. C.
§ 1201 (1948). This statute, known as the "Lindbergh Law," provides severe
criminal penalties for one who "knowingly transports in interstate or foreign
commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled,
decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward
or otherwise..."
16. No state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U. S. Const. Amend. XIV.
17. See note 5 mspra-
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the state was obtained by kidnapping," and, as a matter of inter-
pretation of language, this seems clearly correct.
The federal kidnapping statute, commonly called the "Lind-
bergh Law,""' is probably broad enough to send to jail the law
enforcement official who uses kidnapping and abduction as a short-
cut to avoid extradition.2 But does it provide that a state which
has obtained the presence of an accused person in violation of its
provisions lacks jurisdiction to try him? The Supreme Court re-
cently held no in Frisbw v. Collils.- 1 This seems sound. There is
nothing on the face of the statute which purports to deal with the
matter of jurisdiction at all. A careful perusal of the legislative
history of the statute reveals not a whisper of anything on the
jurisdiction problem, 2-' which obviously was not even considered
by Congress.'
Turning to the due process clause, the problem of federal con-
trol, under this clause, over a state's right to try a person forcibly
kidnapped and imported from another state is but one aspect of
the broad problem of federal control over state criminal procedure
in general-a matter to which the Supreme Court has devoted much
18. Mahon v. justice, 127 U. S. 700 (1888). Two justices dissented on
the ground that the Constitution "clearly implies that there shall be nc
resort to force" (Id. at 716). See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886),
where the accused was kidnapped and abducted, by a representative of a
state, from a foreign country, holding that there was nothing in the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and that country (providing for peace-
ful extradition) violated by trial of the kidnapped person.
The most recent case on federal control over state jurisdiction over a
defendant abducted from another state, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519
(1952), did not mention the extradition provisions of the Constitution or
statutes.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. Note that under the statute the purpose of seizing is not limited to
ransom and reward.
21. 342 U. S. 519 (1952).
22. H. R. Rep. No. 1493, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) ; Sen. Rep. No.
765, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); H. R. Rep. No. 1457, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934); Sen. Rep. No. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 75 Cong.
Rec. 13280-90 (1932).
23. Very likely Congress could, under the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution, U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, constitutionally deprive a state of juris-
diction to try a defendant whose presence in the state was secured through a
violation of the federal kidnapping statute. The commerce clause has been
construed broadly enough in analogous cases to warrant the conclusion that
such a provision would be valid and not an invasion of the powers reserved
to the states. E.g. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689 (1948) (Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act held constitutional as applied to a sale without
required labels at retail six months after importation into state by whole-
saler and subsequent sale by wholesaler to retailer) ; McDermott v. Wis-
consin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913) (Federal Food and Drugs Act held constitu-
tional as applied to rather similar circumstances).
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attention, especially in recent years.2 4 The due process clause, pro-
viding that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law", does not specifically men-
tion criminal procedure at all, much less that particular aspect of
criminal procedure which is considered in this article; yet it is
the principal basis of federal control over procedure in state crimi-
nal cases. The due process clause, as applied to state criminal pro-
cedure, has been said to embrace "principles of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental" ;21 it requires all that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" ;26 and, as applied to state criminal procedure,
"denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 27
Applying this admittedly somewhat indefinite standard2 8 to the
24. See generally Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State
Criminal Procedure, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1946). Thus a number of
cases have dealt with composition of juries in state criminal cases. See Scott,
The Supreme Court's Control over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34
Iowa L. Rev. 577 (1949). A number have dealt with the right of an accused
in a state trial to the assistance of counsel, e.g. Uveges v. Pennsylvania 335
U. S. 437 (1948) ; Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951). Others concern the
use in state criminal trials of coerced confessions, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949) (psychological torture) and companion cases. A recent case
considered the applicability of the McNabb rule of federal procedure (volun-
tary confessions during illegal detention), McNabb v. United States, 318
U. S. 332 (1943), to state criminal cases. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55
(1951). The use in state trials of evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure was considered in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951) and Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165
(1952). Due process has been applied to a variety of other aspects of state
criminal procedure: use by state prosecutor of perjured testimony: see
Boskey & Pickering, supra, at 295-97; prosecution by information rather
than indictment: Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884) ; the right of
the defendant to the privilege against self-incrimination: Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ;
his right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense: Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ; his right to an impartial judge: Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) ; his right to a trial free from domination by a
mob: Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923) ; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S.
309 (1915) ; his right to a public trial: It re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) ;
his right not to be convicted of a crime other than the crime charged: Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (1948).
25. Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1935).
26. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
27. Roberts, J., in Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941).
28. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that due process cannot
be reduced to a mathematical formula. The most recent expression of this
thought appears in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). A minority on
the Court in recent years has sought to make the due process concept more
definite by incorporating by reference into the Fourteenth Amendment all
the provisions of the Bill of Rights (first eight amendments), including
those relating to criminal procedure. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46
(1947) (Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissenting). The
deaths of Murphy and Rutledge have left only Black and Douglas to uphold
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problem of this article, is there a violation of due process in the trial
by a state of a person whose presence in the state was obtained by
kidnapping from another state or country? The Supreme Court
itself squarely held long ago that under these circumstances there
is no violation of due process. 29 In the recent case of Frisbie v.
Collins,0 the Court unanimously reaffirmed its earlier decisions.
The Court stated that the prior decisions "rest on the sound basis
that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is
convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional
procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that
requires a [state] court to permit a guilty person rightfully con-
victed to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will."",
The pre-trial police misconduct considered in this article has no
tendency to convict an innocent person, so long as he is properly
notified of the charge against him and given a fair trial. And it is
true that most of the Supreme Court decisions condemning certain
aspects of state priminal procedure as violations of due process
have involved situations where there is such a danger.3 2 In the
absence of situations creating such a danger, the Court has general-
ly held that pre-trial misconduct by state officials does not violate
due process. 3
On the other hand, a recent Supreme Court decision by a unani-
this view, which they are still vigorously but vainly urging on their col-
leagues. See Justices Black and Douglas concurring in Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, supra.
29. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886) (accused kidnapped in Peru
and abducted into Illinois by an Illinois agent for trial) ; fahon v. Justice,
127 U. S. 700 (1888) (accused kidnapped in West Virginia by Kentucky
agents, and abducted into Kentucky for trial). See Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S.
183, 190-92 (1892) ; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 543 (1893) ; In re
Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 126 (1896) ; Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 596
(1904) ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 207-13 (1906).
30. 342U. S. 519 (1952).
31. Id. at 522.
32. Thus with a trial conducted under mob domination, a trial into which
the accused was rushed unprepared, a trial before a biased jury or judge, a
trial of an inexperienced defendant unrepresented by counsel, a trial involv-
ing the intentional use by the prosecutor of perjured testimony or of a
coerced confession, or a trial at which evidence favorable to the defendant is
suppressed by the prosecutor-with trials conducted under these circum-
stances it is easy to appreciate the danger of convicting an innocent person;
therefore such situations surely deserve to be held violations of due process;
and the Supreme Court has so held. See note 24 supra.
33. Thus it is not a violation of due process for a state at a trial to
receive in evidence matter which has been obtained through pre-trial un-
lawful search and seizure by the state's police officers, unlawful though such
conduct may be. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Similarly, it is not
1953]
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mous court, decided two months before Frisbie v. Collins, held
that an analogous type of pre-trial misconduct constituted a viola-
tion of due process even though it could have no tendency to con-
vict an innocent person. In Rochin v. California,34 three local police
officers, suspecting that Rochin had possession of narcotics, saw
him swallow two capsules. Immediately they seized him and
attempted by force to extract the capsules from his mouth. This
proving unavailing, Rochin was taken to a hospital, where a doctor
f6rced a tube into his throat. An emetic solution was then poured
into Rochin's stomach, and he vomited the two capsules. At
Rochin's trial for illegal possession of narcotics, the capsules were
admitted into evidence by a California court over his objections,
and he was convicted. On certiorari the United States Supreme
Court held unanimously that the conviction must be reversed be-
cause obtained by methods which offend due process. The Court
thus used the due process clause to strike down a phase of state
law enforcement procedure which created no danger of wrongful
conviction ;35 it was done simply as a means of deterring local police
from using methods so brutal and uncivilized and offensive to "the
community's sense of fair play and decency." The brutality involved
in kidnapping is not far removed in degree from the brutality of
the stomach pump. At all events, it is surprising that, in view of
the Rochin case, all of the members of the Supreme Court so
readily concluded that due process was not violated in Frisbie v.
Collins.
The Supreme Court was doubtless reluctant to declare to be a
violation of due process state procedure which a large number of the
states have approved ;36 and, as will be demonstrated below, the
a violation of due process for a state to use evidence secured by its police by
wire tapping, another type of reprehensible pre-trial conduct. People v.
Stemmer, 298 N. Y. 728, 83 N. E. 2d 141 (1948), affd per curiam, 336 U. S.
963 (1949). The question will probably arise again. Schwartz v. State, 246
S. W. 2d 174 (Tex. Cr. App. 1951), aff'd 21 U. S. L. Week 4055 (U. S.
1952). Similarly, as to use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping or by
use of detectaphones, see Scott, Federal Restrictions on Evidence in State
Criinal Cases, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 489 (1950). So too a voluntary confession
obtained during a period of unlawful detention by police (who thus violate
their duty to take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a
magistrate for preliminary examination) is admissible in a state criminal
case in spite of the pre-trial unlawfulness of the conduct of the police
officers. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951).
34. 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
35. The Court pointed out that a state court which admits in evidence
coerced confessions violates due process, not only because of the danger of
their "unreliability," but also because they "offend the community's sense
of fair play and decency." Id. at 173.
36. Thus when dealing with the problem of whether the admission by a
[Vol. 37:91
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many states which have considered the right of the state to try a
kidnapped defendant have unanimously held that there is such a
right. Furthermore, it should be noted that the right, which of
course even a criminal possesses, to be protected from kidnapping
is not completely worthless even if the indirect method of protec-
tion, by refusal to allow prosecution of a person so apprehended,
is denied. The official who behaves in this manner is liable criminal-
ly for kidnapping, a serious crime in all states, and for violation of
the federal kidnapping statute; he is also liable civilly to the vic-
tim for false imprisonment or assault and battery.37 While it is
arguable that this sort of protection is not worth much, because the
states hesitate to prosecute their over-zealous officers criminally,
and policemen are usually not wealthy enough to warrant civil
actions against them, yet the argument as to the worthlessness of
civil and criminal remedies against law enforcement officials who
conduct illegal searches and seizures did not persuade the Supreme
Court to hold that the due process clause must strike down the use
in state courts of evidence thus obtained as the only possible effec-
tive remedy to deter such wrongdoing. 38
B. STATE LAW UNRESTRICTED BY FEDERAL CONTROL
The Supreme Court having settled that the trial by a state of a
defendant who has been kidnapped and imported from another
state or country does not constitute a violation of any federal right
secured to the defendant by any provision of the United States
Constitution or of federal legislation, the question remains: how
should the state itself decide the question of whether it is proper
to try such a defendant? About half of the states have considered
the problem, and they unanimously agree that the state has juris-
state of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure violates due process,
the Supreme Court, in deciding that there was no such violation, took note of
the fact that most states allow such evidence. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25, 29 (1949). The holdings of the various states on state criminal procedure
are not perhaps entitled to great weight in the Supreme Court if the question
before the Court concerns a matter of federal procedure; thus the state rules
allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence did not convince the Court in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). But where due process is
involved, state conclusions are highly relevant.
37. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 444 (1886), emphasizing that
in view of these protections, it was not necessary to condem the trial under
the due process clause. It has been held that federal law enforcement officers
were guilty of kidnapping when they seized and abducted criminals from
another country. Collier v. Vacaro, 51 F. 2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Villareal
v. Hammond, 74 F. 2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934).
38. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). The inadequacy of alterna-
tive remedies is more apt to be decisive with the Supreme Court if the
problem is not one of due process but of proper federal procedure, as in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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diction and ought to exercise itY8 Even the federal courts (in the
absence of any decision by the United States Supreme Court) have
held in the corresponding situation that the federal courts have
jurisdiction to try a defendant abducted from a foreign country.40
At one time two states, Kansas and Nebraska, took the view that
it would be against public policy for the state to sanction such un-
lawful police behavior by permitting the trial of a defendant whose
presence was procured by kidnapping.41 Both these states have
since overruled their former decisions.42
39. See cases collected in Note, 165 A.L.R. 947, 958-61 (1946). Cases
cited are from 17 states: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming; as
well as those of federal courts (including the District of Columbia) and
cases from England and Canada. More recent state cases, adding four juris-
dictions to the total, are State v. Moore, 50 A. 2d 791 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1946) ;
Foster v. Hudspeth, 170 Kan. 338, 224 P. 2d 987 (1950), cert. dismnissed, 340
U. S. 940 (1951) ; People v. Mahler, 329 Mich. 155, 45 N. W. 2d 14 (1950),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 949 (1951) ; Wise v. State, 96 N. E. 2d 786 (Ohio
App. 1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 166 Pa. Super. 413,
72 A. 2d 150 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 866 (1951) ; In re Greenough,
75 A. 2d 569 (Vt. 1950).
40. See cases collected note 13 supra. This result is somewhat surpris-
ing (and will doubtless be overruled when the Supreme Court considers the
problem) in view of the high standards required by the Court of federal law
enforcement officers in other areas of law enforcement. E.g. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 338 (1914) (evidence secured by illegal search and
seizure) ; and McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943) (voluntary
confessions during illegal detention). See United States v. Rosenberg, 195
F. 2d 583, 602-3 (2d Cir. 19.52), suggesting the analogy of the McNabb rule
to federal defendants kidnapped from foreign countries at the instigation of
federal officers. The Supreme Court is not as strict in similar cases concern-
ing state law enforcement officers. E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
(1949) (evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure); Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951) (voluntary confession during illegal deten-
tion).
41. State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888), where the court
stated: "It would not be proper for the courts of this state to favor, or even
to tolerate, breaches of the peace committed by their own officers, in a sister
state... [Jurisdiction should not be sustained when obtained only] in viola-
tion of some well-recognized rule of honesty or fair dealing, as by force or
fraud .. . [Such jurisdiction] would not only be a special wrong against the
individual . . .but it would also be a general wrong against society itself-
a violation of those fundamental principles of mutual trust and confidence
which lie at the very foundation of all organized society, and which are neces-
sary in the very nature of things to hold society together" (18 Pac. at 178-9).
In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N. W. 267, 8 L. R. A. 398 (1890), where
the court said: "We cannot sanction the method adopted to bring the peti-
tioner into the jurisdiction of this state . . .the district court, therefore, did
not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner." (45 N.W. at 268).
42. Foster v. Hudspeth, 170 Kan. 338, 224 P. 2d 987 (1950), cert.
dismissed, 340 U. S. 940 (1951) (not mentioning the Simmons case but, it
would seem, overruling it by implication) ; Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885,




Are these unanimous decisions correct on principle? There can
be no one answer which is demonstratively true. The answer de-
pends upon the weight to be given to two sometimes conflicting
policies: the policy that criminals should be punished; and the fre-
quently opposing policy that government officials must observe the
rules of fair play, even when dealing with criminals. It may well be
that, as a result of lawlessness in law enforcement, the benefits from
jailing criminals are more than offset by the loss of respect for
law by society in general.43
It is submitted that, while it is not surprising that some states
conclude that it is more important to imprison criminals than to
deter police from kidnapping by refusal to use their courts for the
trial of kidnapped individuals-yet it is surprising that they are
unanimous in this conclusion. This is particularly true in view of
the fact that some of these same states do refuse to accept the re-
sults of police misconduct in closely analogous situations.
Thus as to the admissibility of evidence secured by illegal
searches and seizures, one-third of the states follow the federal
rule and exclude such evidence.4 4 The theory of these states is that
the threat of possible criminal and civil actions against police offi-
cials is not sufficient by itself to restrain the police from such mis-
conduct; so that it is necessary, in order to give suitable protec-
tion to the right to privacy, to tell the police, "You cannot make
use in court of any evidence you find in this way." It would seem
that the existence of the remedies of civil and criminal actions
against policemen who kidnap and abduct are equally inadequate,45
and that the right to be free from unlawful bodily interference by
police officers is at least as important as the right to be free from
43. "Respect for law, which is the fundamental prerequisite of law ob-
servance, hardly can be expected of people in general if the officers charged
wiht enforcement of the law do not set the example of obedience to its pre-
cepts." National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 1. Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (evidence obtained by wire tapping held admissible
in federal trials), thought it "less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part." On the other hand,
the majority in that case thought that a certain amount of "dirty business"
-e.g. the use of decoys-was necessary in dealing with the criminal classes.
44. See cases collected in appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
33-39 (1949). States there listed as adopting the federal rule of exclusion
are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Delaware has recently joined this list,
overruling its previous holdings. Rickards v. State, 77 A. 2d 199 (Del. 1950).
45. See notes 37 and 38 supra and text thereto.
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unlawful search and seizure of property by them ;46 so that the
only effective way to deter police from such lawlessness is to say
to them, "W1e will not try a criminal whose presence in the state
has been thus secured."
It used to be practically a universal rule that a court did not care
about the illegal manner in which evidence was obtained, so long as
the evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible; but, as the il-
legal search and seizure cases show, this rule, under federal influ-
ence, is no longer altogether true in many states. It seems not un-
likely that the practically universal rule of today-that a court
which has a defendant before it will not bother itself with how he
came to be there-will in the future similarly be revised, in some
states at least.
All states exclude (indeed, the Supreme Court has said they
must exclude) from evidence in a state criminal trial confessions
obtained by police coercion, whether the coercion is physical or
psychological .4 7There has been a good deal of debate as to the
rationale of this exclusionary rule,48 but the Supreme Court very
recently stated that at least in part the basis of the rule is to deter
law enforcement officers from this sort of misconduct.49 If exclusion
of coerced confessions is desirable in order to prevent "third degree"
practices, it would seem that refusal to allow prosecution might be
a desirable device for preventing police kidnapping, a callous prac-
tice not far removed in obnoxiousness from the "third degree."
It is a uniform rule of both federal and state courts that where
the police lure a person into committing a crime by planting the
intent to commit the crime in his mind, doie so that he may be
46. In fact, the right to be free from bodily harm would seem the more
important. The Supreme Court apparently recognizes this when it holds that
a state does not violate due process when it admits evidence secured by an
illegal police search and seizure of defendant's premises, Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U. S. 25 (1949), while at the same time it holds that a state does violate
due process if the evidence is obtained from the body by police use of the
stomach pump, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
47. See note 24 supra.
48. Dean Wigmore believed the proper reason for exclusion is the un-
reliable and untrustworthy nature of such evidence, 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 822 (3d ed. 1940) ; Prof. Morgan that a coerced confession violates the
privilege against self-incrimination, Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (1949) ; and Dean McCormick that
the confession must be excluded in order to restrain police investigators from
practicing the "third degree," McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the
Law of Evidence, 16 Te;. L. Rev. 447, 452-7 (1938).
49. See Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173 (1952), pointing out
that a coerced confession is excluded even if statements contained in the
confession are independently established as true.
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prosecuted for the crime, he has the defense of entrapment. 0 The
rationale of this defense is not altogether clear. In the leading case
on entrapment the Supreme Court justices differed, five believing
that entrapment negatived the commission of the crime; three that,
although the defendant was guilty of the crime, "the courts must
be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own
agents . . . (as an) overruling principle of public policy"1 If
this latter theory is, as many believe, the true basis of the defense
of entrapment, it would seem that states which allow the defense
might well be equally reluctant to open their courts to the trial of
persons kidnapped by its agents from other states or foreign
countries.
There are two other analogies in the field of criminal procedure
-evidence secured by wire tapping and confessions obtained dur-
ing illegal detention-which, however, tend to point the other
way, because of the reluctance of the states to exclude such evi-
dence.12 It may well be argued, however, that the evils attendant
upon police wire tapping and police detention (unaccompanied by
coercion) are less dangerous than those involved in violent and
forcible kidnapping by police officers; so that a state which refuses
to restrain police from doing the former (by the indirect method
of exclusion of evidence) might not inconsistently deter police from
50. The leading case is Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 430 (1932).
For a collection of cases, see Notes, 18 A. L. R. 146 (1922) ; 66 A. L. R.
478 (1930) ; 86 A. L. R. 263 (1933).
51. Sorrells v. United States, spra note 50, at 459, per Roberts, J.,
Brandeis and Stone JJ. concurring with Roberts, J.
52. Thus the states which have dealt with the matter have generally
held that evidence secured by wire tapping is not to be excluded bceause of
police misconduct in obtaining it; and also that the Federal Communications
Act § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1946), does not forbid
the use in state courts of wire-tapped evidence. See Scott, Federal Restric-
tions on Evidence in State Criminal Cases, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 489, 506-8
(1950). But four Supreme Court justices, led by Holmes and Brandeis,
thought that federal courts should not (even without § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act, not enacted until later) admit evidence secured by
illegal wire tapping, a "dirty business"; the police should be deterred by an
exclusionary rule. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
The McNabb rule of federal procedure excluding from federal courts
voluntary confessions obtained during a period of illegal detention, McNabb
v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), is designed to deter police from
neglecting their duty to take an arrested person before a commissioner for
preliminary examination without unnecessary delay. See United States v.
Carignan, 342 U. S. 36, 44-45 (1951), saying that "the reason for the
[McNabb] rule" is "to abolish unlawful detention." But although all the
states impose a similar statutory or common law duty on the police, the
states have consistently refused to follow the McNabb lead. Inbau, Lie De-
tection and Criminal Interrogation 168-9 (2d ed. 1948). The most recent
cases are State v. Pierce, 4 N. J. 252, 72 A. 2d 305 (1950) ; Henderson v.
State, 229 P. 2d 196 (Okla. Crim. 1951) ; State v. Gardner, 230 P. 2d 559
(Utah 1951) ; State v. Winters, 236 P. 2d 1038 (Wash. 1951).
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doing the latter by closing its courts to the trial of an individual
so mistreated by the police.
It may also be noted that in one unusual state case 53 it was held
that testimony of police officers who physically beat a prisoner
in their care should be rejected at the trial because of their abuse
of the prisoner. The court reached this result by analogy to the
rule of exclusion of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure,
holding it better that the guilty escape than that the officers be
permitted to give testimony procured by violation of the law. Here
then is another example of the use of an indirect method to deter
police lawlessness.
Leaving now analogies in the field of criminal procedure and
turning to those in the field of civil procedure, we find these to
be well-settled rules as to civil jurisdiction: where a non-resident
person is lured into the state by the fraud of the plaintiff, the state
will not exercise jurisdiction over him; similarly, "a state does not
in civil cases exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident brought into
a state by unlawful force. 5. 4 It would seem that if a court will not
exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant brought
into a state by the unlawful fraud or force of the plaintiff, it ought
not to exercise jurisdiction in a criminal case over an out-of-state
defendant who is brought into the state by the unlawful fraud or
force of the state's law enforcement agents.
Some of the state cases holding that the states have criminal
jurisdiction in the kidnapping situation55 did consider the ana-
logy to civil jurisdiction but decided the analogy to be inappro-
priate.5 6 The theory of these cases was that in the civil case the
plaintiff who uses fraud or force is himself guilty of a wrong; but
not so the state itself when the state's police commit the wrong. 7
53. Churn v. State. 184 Tenn. 646, 202 S. W. 2d 345 (1947).
54. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 78 (1934); 1 Beale, Conflict of
Laws §§ 78.3, 78.4 (1935) ; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 189 (3d ed. 1949) ;
Note, Jurisdiction over Persons Brought into a State by Force or Fraud,
39 Yale L. J. 889 (1930); Note, 1916C Ann. Cas. 612, 615-16; Ex parte
Edwards, 99 Cal. App. 541, 278 Pac. 910, 290 Pac. 591 (1929) (brought
into state by unlawful force).
The view of the writers supra is that the court probably has jurisdiction
but will not exercise its jurisdiction. Thus where the fraud (or force) is
that of third parties, not that of the plaintiff or someone in privity with him,
the court has and will exercise jurisdiction, e.g., Ex parte Taylor, 29 R. I.
129, 69 Atl. 553 (1908) ; Note, 20 A. L. R. 2d 163, 186 (1951).
55. See note 39 supra.
56. State v. Moore, 50 A. 2d 791 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1946) ; State v.
Ross, 21 Iowa 467 (1866). See In re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 126 (1897).
Contra: State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888), discussed at
note 41 supra and text thereto.
57. E.g., State v. Ross, stpra note 56, at 471: "There is no fair analogy
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It is submitted that the better view is that the state is a single
entity, whether represented by the prosecutor, the court, or the
police, rather than several separate entities.58 What the police do in
line of duty should be deemed done by the state as well as for the
state. This view is, of course, the basis of the many state decisions
which exclude evidence secured by illegal searches and seizures,59
or which exclude coerced confessions (insofar as they are excluded
on the theory that exclusion is necessary to deter police from
"third degree" practices)," ° or which close their courts to the
prosecution of persons who have been "entrapped" into commit-
ting a crime by police officers."1 The federal courts recognize that
the government as law-enforcer is the same entity as the govern-
ment as prosecutor and judge when they apply the McNabb rule
excluding in federal courts even voluntary confessions when made
during unlawful police detention.6 2
It would appear, then, that the civil jurisdiction analogy is
apt, and that a state which closes its courts to a plaintiff who ob-
tained service of process on a non-resident defendant whom he
lured into the state by fraud or imported therein by unlawful force
should also refuse to open its courts to the criminal prosecution
of an out-of-state defendant whose presence was obtained by that
state's police in a comparable fashion.
One more consideration ought to induce at least some of the
states to refuse to sanction the trial of criminals whose presence in
the state is obtained in direct violation of federal and state kid-
napping and extradition laws. It may be true that none of these
provisions can by any process of statutory interpretation be con-
strued so broadly as to prohibit a state's trial of an individual who
has been subjected to a lawless violation of these provisions by
police officials. In the absence of any legislation, the answer must
be found in the common law. But upon what, after all, do common
between civil and criminal cases in this respect. In the one (civil) the party
invoking the aid of the court is guilty of fraud or violence in bringing the
defendant . . . within the jurisdiction of the court. In the other (criminal)
the people, the state, is guilty of no wrong."
58. See Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 470 (1928), linking together the federal prosecutor and the federal court
in a case involving admissibility of evidence secured by unlawful wire tap-
ping: "... no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor
and the Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit district
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business, it does not permit the judge
to allow such iniquities to succeed.'
59. See note 44 supra and text thereto.
60. See note 48 supra and text thereto.
61. See note 50 supra and text thereto.
62. See note 52 mipra.
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law rules depend? They depend upon principle, upon policy. And
how is that policy to be discovered? At least in part it is to be dis-
covered in legislation, which often reflects a policy broader than
the actual coverage of the statutes themselves. The state and federal
extradition statutes and kidnapping laws are all expressive of a
policy strongly opposed to the police practices considered in this
article. In order further to effectuate this policy, and to discourage
these practices, the courts should rule as a matter of common law
that they will not exercise jurisdiction over individuals whose
presence was obtained in violation of these statutes.63
If a state should decide that its policy forbids the trial of a
person kidnapped and imported from another state, it may then
have to draw some lines. Assuming that the state should hold there
is no jurisdiction to try the defendant if the state's own officers
do the kidnapping on their own initiative, what if the kidnapping
is done by the same officers but with the blessing of the police of
the asylum state? Or what if the latter themselves obligingly seize
him and dump him over the state border? Or suppose that pri-
vate persons, rather than the police, perform the abduction. Perhaps
there is an analogy in the cases involving illegal searches and seiz-
ures in those jurisdictions which adopt the federal rule of exclusion:
evidence obtained by the officers of the prosecuting government or
by others cooperating with or instigated by them is excluded;84
but not so evidence handed over by other governments or by
private parties acting on their own initiative. 65
CONCLUSIONS
The United States Supreme Court has definitely settled that the
trial by a state of an individual whose presence in the state was
procured by his unlawful kidnapping and abduction by the police
of that state is not a violation of the federal kidnapping statute, of
the extradition provisions of the federal Constitution or statute or
of the due process clause.
As to how the states, if unrestrained by federal control, should
decide, it is surprising to find that all the states which have con-
sidered the problem permit the trial of persons who are in the
63. See for specific instances of this line of reasoning Dowling, Patter-
son and Powell, Materials for Legal Method, c. 7 (2d ed. 1952), entitled
"Coordination of Judge-Made and Statute Law."
64. E.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927).
65. E.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921). See cases cited
in Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L. Q. 337, 353 n. 68-72(1939).
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state by virtue of this sort of police lawlessness. This is inconsistent
with the views of at least some of these states as to analogous
situations in the fields of criminal and civil procedure. There are
strong reasons for deterring police from this type of lawless law
enforcement, and these reasons of policy are embodied in the legisla-
tion of all the states and of the United States Government.
It seems that the courts have simply fallen into the habit of
repeating, parrot-like, that a court does not care how a defendant
comes before the court, without thinking whether such a rule is
sound on principle. In these days of low moral standards among
public officials, both law enforcement officers and others, it is
especially important to re-establish public respect for law. This
simply cannot be done if the very people who enforce the law are
themselves guilty of serious violations of law. A rule of procedure
which would forbid courts to try accused persons who have been
subjected to the type of lawless treatment covered in this article
would help to resurrect something we seem to have lost and which
we badly need to find-a spirit of respect for law and order.
